What the county's own auditor found

Updated November 3, 2025

• Refused to let the auditor check ballot-counting security. The report says the Clerk "refused to discuss or provide any information" about the Clear Ballot vote-counting system, including the election security plan required by state law, staff training records, and a basic security checklist. As a result, the auditor could not "provide assurance that the system is secure." [Audit report, p. 7–9]
• County rules require access. County code requires every county officer to give the auditor "unrestricted access" to information. The auditor found that state law does not stop the Clerk from sharing this with auditors, and that the lack of any legal reason "suggests a lack of valid grounds for refusal." [Audit report, p. 9]
• Drop boxes that don't meet disability standards. 7 of the county's 11 ballot drop boxes had openings higher than the 48-inch limit, and 4 had pavement gaps wider than half an inch. Staff did not check the boxes against disability-access standards and had no plan to fix them. [Audit report, p. 12–13]
• No help info on the website. The auditor found the Clerk's website had no information about voting accommodations for people with disabilities or about translation help. Disability advocates said there wasn't enough awareness. [Audit report, p. 20–21]
• Fought the report instead of fixing it. The Clerk called the audit "misinformation and false narratives" and called for "auditing reforms." He held back his full response until after the report was published. The auditor said his response was "surprising" and showed "a significant gap in understanding of the purpose of the audit function." [Audit report, p. cover, 22, 24]
• Tried to get past problems taken out. The Clerk asked the auditor to remove a paragraph about the 2024 audit's security problems. The auditor refused. [Audit report, p. 35]

June 2024

• Shared logins. Staff shared logins because logging in and out "took too much time," and the office used a generic shared account. [County audit] [Audit report, p. 8]
• Security controls switched off. According to the 2025 audit report, office staff turned off supervisor review in the office's software "to make it easier to void receipts and to circumvent review processes." [Audit report, p. 8] [2024 audit]
• Loose money controls. Cash-handling procedures were incomplete, purchasing rules weren't followed consistently, and a county purchasing card wasn't secured. [County audit]
• Slow to fix. The audit made 13 recommendations. Nine months later, the office still had not done the fraud risk assessment the auditor recommended or fixed its purchasing problems. Four recommendations remain open. [County audit]

• Ballots mailed in another county's envelopes. For the May 2024 primary, some Deschutes ballot packets went out in Benton County envelopes. [KTVZ]
• Ballots sent to people who had died. Central Oregon residents reported getting ballots addressed to deceased voters. The Clerk admitted "some names may slip through the cracks." [KBND]
• 12 non-citizens on Deschutes voter rolls. In 2024, 12 people in Deschutes County who are not U.S. citizens were found registered to vote. The error started at the state DMV and passed through the Secretary of State to the county. The Clerk said none of the 12 had voted, and they were taken off the active rolls. Jon believes the county should catch errors like this itself, not wait for the state to find them. [The Bulletin] [KBND]